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This paper explores the emerging green dimension of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), with special attention to its relationship with the international 
agricultural trading regime. It sheds light on the unusual event of international 
trade liberalisation pressures pushing forward a “greening” of European sectoral 
policy. First, the GATT context operated to impose constraints on the 
continuation of the CAP, and with it the production of negative environmental 
side-effects. Second, from the GATT negotiations emerged the positive incentive 
to shift support for farmers to less trade distorting social and environmental 
measures.
This paper begins by investigating the environmental dimension of the 
CAP prior to the MacSharry reforms and the closure of the Uruguay Round. It 
describes the—quite limited— integration of environmental concerns into the CAP 
prior to the 1992 reform and traces its roots to merely internal factors, such as a 
rising environmental awareness, intra-EC trade harmonisation, and the desire to 
maintain social structures in rural areas, especially in southern Europe. The 
degree and form of “greening” the CAP at that point was not limited by 
considerations related to maintaining the international competitiveness of 
European agriculture. The nevertheless limited character of environmental policy 
integration into the CAP can be explained, instead, by the firmly institutionalised 
traditional structure of the CAP, preventing the radical reform necessary to 
remove the policy's negative environmental externalities, and by the limited funds 
and political support for expanding structural adjustment measures targeted at 
environmental objectives.
I will then show how the latest GATT round played an explicitly positive 
role in the process of environmental policy integration in the CAP during the 
early 1990s. I argue that the GATT negotiations formed the necessary context for 
an incomplete and yet dramatic shift in the CAP’S objectives and its choice of 
policy instruments. As the completion of the Uruguay Round foreclosed the 
option of maintaining the level of the EC's long-standing agricultural support 
scheme based on guaranteed prices, EC policy instruments to provide support for 
the farming sectors were partly shifted towards direct income support and service 
payments, in other words instruments that were not only less trade-distorting but 
also preferable from an environmental perspective.
A closer look at the GATT negotiations reveals an interesting picture of 
two-way causalities and policy feedback: Not only did the GATT facilitate an 
environmental improvement of the CAP, but at the same time, environmental 
rhetoric helped bring about the political compromise resulting in the completion 
of the Uruguay Round and the signing of the Marrakesh Accords in 1994. In part, 



























































































between trade-distorting and non-distorting agricultural support measures and the 
applicability of GATT rules only to the former. In an effort to rescue the political 
deal, however, a certain degree of environmental and social “window dressing,” 
aimed at minimising the portion of domestic support payments that would be 
subjected to liberalisation requirements, was employed in the negotiation of 
operational details of the GATT agriculture agreement.
In short, this working paper argues that in the case of agricultural trade, the 
liberalisation of the European regime and the provision of GATT exemptions on 
environmental grounds went hand in hand. It proceeds as follows: Part two 
focuses on the environmental externalities of the CAP and its limited 
environmental reforms prior to 1992; it highlights these reforms' exclusively 
internal rationales and the absence of an international dimension - either 
negatively or positively. The “greening” of the CAP through the MacSharry 
reform, in contrast, needs to be situated in the international trade negotiations, as 
explained in part three. The concluding part ventures into hypothetical future 
scenarios for the CAP and its environmental dimension.
The CAP's Environmental Dimension Prior to “Uruguay” and “MacSharry”
Environmental Effects o f the CAP and Early Environmental Measures
The objectives of the CAP, as set up in 1957 (Arts. 38-43 of the Treaty of Rome), 
did not include environmental protection, nor was the architecture of the CAP 
compatible with such an objective as the following decades would show. Most of 
the steadily rising CAP budget was allocated to the market price support system, 
based on variable import levies, variable export refunds and intervention prices,2 
which implied a number of economic, social and environmental problems.
In brief, economically the CAP suffered from its producers' insulation from 
market pressures combined with their unlimited incentive to produce. It resulted 
in a structural oversupply of several goods -  one may recall the European butter 
mountains and milk lakes. Between 1987 and 1991 the value of EC agricultural 
surplus increased by a factor of six to approximately 6 billion ECU.3 The
2 Import levies raise the price of the imported good above a so-called threshold price which lies 
above the Community price level. Variable export refunds compensate EC exporters for the 
difference that exists between Community and world market prices. Finally, in the event that EC 
prices fall beneath the intervention price, Community authorities purchase and store EC farm 
products in order to reduce available supply and hence raise market prices.




























































































economic costs are bom by the EC budget, hence tax payers, and European 
consumers.4 The policy failed equally to achieve its social objectives as the living 
standard of the average European farmer remains below the population's average 
and the distribution of payments has been very uneven. The Commission 
estimated that in the mid-1980s eighty percent of CAP expenditure reached a 
mere twenty percent of European farmers, these being typically the larger and 
more efficiently operating producers in the northern regions (CEC 1991a: 1).
Environmental degradation in the agricultural sector is the result of a 
combination of market failures in the agricultural sector, failing to internalise its 
environmental cost (such as the exploitation and pollution of water and soil 
resources), and non-market (or government) failures operating to reinforce these 
market failures (OECD 1994:110-114, Runge 1993:96-7). It has been widely 
acknowledged that the market is biased against environmental protection because 
the polluter pays principle is generally not applied to the European agricultural 
sector.5 On the government failure side, the CAP, with its system of guaranteed 
prices which effectively couples financial support to production output—and 
surplus, contributes to environmental damage, aside from being trade-distorting, 
economically costly and socially suboptimal as just described. The Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) has linked the European agricultural production 
system and practices directly to environmental effects such as the pollution and 
contamination of soil, water, air, and food due to increased agro-chemical use and 
livestock effluents, the degradation of natural resources, the disturbance and 
reduction of biotops and wildlife habitats, and the loss of biological and genetic 
diversity (cited in Runge 1993:105).
4 In 1992, CAP spending amounted to 35.8 billion ECU (Tracy 1993:172). Transfer to the 
agricultural sector including public spending by national governments was 51.8 billion ECU, 
while the cost of agricultural support bom by consumers has been calculated as 69.3 billion 
ECU. The share of total agricultural policy transfers in the EC of the GDP equals two percent 
(CEC 1994a:26).
5 The most systematic study in this context has been produced by Baldock and Bennett (1991). 
They argue that agriculture may claim to be a special case with respect to the polluter pays 
principle (PPP), due to the predominance of non-point sources of pollution which are difficult to 
monitor and control, complex cause-effect relationships in some agro-ecosystems, social and 
political considerations connected to small farmers especially, and limits to a radical change in 
land use patterns. Nevertheless, they regret that “no country has made a systematic effort to 
apply the PPP to agriculture” (ibid.: 11) and argue that ‘“second best’ solutions - involving 
regulations and, perhaps, subsidies - will in practice be necessary if agricultural pollution is to be 




























































































Despite clear evidence of environment-related market and government 
failures, reform attempts directed at the European agricultural policy were limited 
prior to 1992. Although the agro-environmental agenda began to be set in 1985 
with the Commission's green paper on perspectives of the CAP which - in 
response to an intervention by DGXI - proposed that agricultural policy should 
“take account of environmental policy, both as regards the control of harmful 
practices and the promotion of practices friendly to the environment” (CEC 
1985a, cited in Baldock and Lowe 1996:12), the actual changes to the CAP 
consisted of only marginal modifications of the guidance section of the CAP 
(structural support for fanners extensifying production, setting aside land and 
maintaining environmentally sensitive areas) and some quantitative restrictions of 
agricultural production (the introduction of co-responsibility levies on surplus- 
producing farmers and a budget ceiling).
Quantitative restrictions were argued to limit the incentive to use agro­
chemicals as well as the (over-)production of manure in intensive livestock 
holdings. The Council Regulation 797/85 on Improving the Efficiency of 
Agricultural Structures authorised member states to develop national support 
schemes in environmentally sensitive areas (ESAs). It further offered EC-funded 
premiums for farmers who engage in extensification and set-aside measures. Two 
years later, Council Regulation 1760/87 was adopted which made ESA support 
eligible for up to 25 percent EC-co-financing. Following a review of Regulation 
1760/87 in 1990, the Commission announced its intention to reinforce the 
relationship between agriculture and the environment (CEC 1990a) and packaged 
the three measures (extensification, set-aside, ESAs) into the a proposal (CEC 
1990b) that was to become the core of the Council Regulation 2078/92 on 
Agricultural Measures Compatible with the Requirements o f the Protection o f the 
Environment and the Maintenance of the Countryside which accompanied the 
MacSharry reforms of the CAP.
The environmental effects of the 1985 and 1987 agricultural structures 
legislation remained limited, however. They constituted a minimal counterweight 
to the environment-unfriendly guarantee section of the CAP. Also, the measures 
suffered from a northern bias by focusing on side-effects of intensive production 
and neglecting issues such as soil erosion, desertification or forest fires which 
concerned primarily southern member states and parts of France. Consequently, 
the early set-aside scheme was taken up only by Germany, Belgium, France and 
Italy; the ESA option was implemented only by the UK, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Denmark. Only after the possibility of EC financial aid was 
introduced in 1987 did Italy, France, Luxembourg, Ireland and Spain start small 




























































































Even more limited were attempts to “control actions harmful to the 
environment” in the agricultural sector as declared desirable in the 1985 green 
paper. The regulatory measures related to the protection of water quality adopted 
by the EC since the 1970s had little impact on agricultural production practices. 
The implementation measures generally ignored the prevention principle by 
calling for remedial action rather than controlling the sources of pollution such as 
the leaching of agro-chemicals and livestock manure into water resources. In 
other words, not farmers but water authorities were primarily targeted by EC 
water legislation. Gradual realisation that existing implementation attempts are 
insufficient to meet quality goals laid down in the EC water legislation has led to 
recent pressures toward restructuring and improving their effectiveness (CEC 
1996b).
The 1991 Council Directive Concerning the Protection o f Waters Against 
Pollution Caused by Nitrates from Agricultural Sources (91/676/EEC) has been 
the first attempt to break with the previous pattern of remedial action by placing 
the spot-light directly on the fanning sector.6 The Directive does not go as far as 
requiring the application of the polluter pays principle, however. Nigel Haigh 
traces its history to the 1980 Drinking Water Directive (80/778/EEC) which set a 
nitrate limit of 50mg/l. While the Drinking Water Directive focused on remedial 
action which tends to be costly, the 1991 Nitrate Directive “aims to reduce and 
prevent the pollution of water caused by the application and storage of inorganic 
fertilisers and manure on farmland” (Haigh 1992:4.4-12 and 4.14-1, emphasis 
added). It obliges member states to develop action programmes to ensure the 
reduction of nitrate pollution in designated “vulnerable zones.” Farmers in these 
vulnerable zones may be compensated by their national governments for the 
financial losses they incur.
To review, the CAP as originally conceived not only fails to correct 
negative environmental externalities produced by market mechanisms in the 
agricultural sectors, it even exacerbates environmental problems through 
government failures implied in the CAP’S price support structure. Since 1985, 
minimal measures to reduce the negative ecological impact of public intervention 
were implemented and limited regulatory policies aimed at reducing the market 
failures introduced. The following section will identify the mostly EC-internal 
reasons for these changes.




























































































Pressures and Constraints Related to pre-1992 Environmental Policy Integration
Contrary to other cases discussed in this volume, the initial “greening” of the 
CAP since the mid-1980s was not resisted on the basis of its effects on the 
international competitiveness of European farmers.7 Simple explanations for this 
phenomenon are (a) the relative absence of a - domestic or international - 
environmental agenda that related to European farming practices and (b) the 
sheltered existence from international trading pressures led by European farmers 
due to CAP protection. Prices received by European farmers for their produce 
internally and on the export market remained relatively unaffected by 
international competitive pressures since they were established during the 
Agriculture Council negotiations which, prior to the completion of the Uruguay 
Round, took place independent of international agricultural trading agreements.
In tracing early environmental policy integration in EC agricultural policy, 
it appears that the evolution of the CAP can be explained by reference to 
primarily internal factors. At the same time, however, internal factors also posed 
the constraint for more drastic measures. In brief, the increasing salience of 
environmental issues constituted the motivation for “greening” the CAP; 
mounting legal and more notably fiscal challenges to the legitimacy of the 
traditional CAP created the beginnings of a permissive structure for reforms. On 
the constraining side, the deep institutionalisation of the CAP in the fabric of the 
EC prevented radical change.
The salience of environmental issues related to agricultural production 
emerged slower than the realisation and response to negative environmental 
externalities generated by traditional industrial processes. This was due to the 
“green” image of agriculture and the general public's valuation of farmers as 
“guardians of the environment” and providers of “stability and rootedness” 
(Keeler 1995). The relative blindness with regard to the negative side-effects of 
the CAP was reinforced by its “sacred nature” within the Community's 
framework, the powerful agricultural lobby nationally and in Brussels, and the 
structural insulation of agricultural policy making from external pressures such as 
financial, foreign trade, social or environmental objectives (Lenschow 1995, 
1996).
7 With respect to the Nitrate Directive it can be argued that the existence of international 
environmental agreements or action plans on the protection of the North and Baltic Seas 




























































































Until the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986, the CAP 
constituted the core, and hence symbol, of the European integration project; 
systemic radical reforms of the CAP were therefore out of the question as they 
would have been perceived as unravelling the larger European edifice (Urwin 
1991:135, Marsh and Swanney 1980, Tracy 1989). The fact that the strong 
corporatist tradition in European agriculture had been extended to the EC-level, 
with strong ties of the European agricultural federation COPA and its member 
organisations to the policy making process, further solidified the status quo in 
agricultural support. The same was true for the insulated structure of CAP 
decision making, characterised by the EC's general functional fragmentation, 
exacerbated by the separate existence of the Special Committee on Agriculture 
preparing the Councils. As a consequence, the CAP allowed agricultural 
ministers and their clientele to escape - already minimal - national cross-policy 
scrutiny, such as pressures from their colleagues with the finance portfolio to 
avoid budgetary overruns or from environmental ministers to comply with 
environmental objectives, without being subjected to at least equivalent scrutiny 
on the European level. In fact, until the 1988 reforms which introduced a ceiling 
for CAP budgetary increases, the Agriculture Council acted as irresponsibly as it 
did quite unchecked.
Several factors began to undermine the CAP’S special status in the mid- 
1980s, however. With food security as the primary objective of the CAP 
achieved, the costliness and wastefulness of the policy's operations gained in 
attention among the European population. This awareness was reinforced by the 
single market project which challenged the CAP as the symbolic centre of the EC 
and emerged as a competitor for scarce European funds. Budget constraints 
became the primary impetus for subsequent CAP reforms which consequently 
focused on the problem of finance-draining surplus production. Analysing the 
policy discourse since the mid-1980s, it appears that the linkage between budget 
pressures and the environmental problem of European agriculture has been 
constructed in two different ways. First, environmental measures which carry the 
promise of resulting in lower yields due to extensification or reduced input of 
agro-chemicals are proposed as serving not only environmental interests but also 
contributing to surplus reduction. Secondly, and partly in contrast, to the extent 
that it could be argued that high budgetary expenditures for the agriculture sector 
helped support the provision of desirable services such as environmental 
stewardship in rural areas, a sizeable common agricultural policy could still be 
justified to an increasingly critical public and hence maintained. On the basis of 
these two rationales, the “greening” of the CAP represented an attempt at re­
packaging a policy under attack into one acceptable to the growing policy 




























































































Both “policy linkages” are contained in a statement by Environment 
Commissioner Clinton Davis who argued in 1985 that
[in its] role as the protector of the environment, of the landscape, and of natural 
habitats[, the farming sector] thus renders services to society for which there is a 
real demand. Direct income support, which may be indispensable for income or 
market reasons and which has the advantage of not encouraging higher 
production, can take account of the role of agriculture in the environment (CEC 
1985b:2, emphasis added).
These ideas were quite controversial, when first voiced, however. DG VI 
(agriculture) accepted the notion of rewarding the agricultural sector for 
rendering environmental services and favoured expanding the structural payments 
of the CAP in the form of accompanying measures while denying the “direct 
link” between the market support and environmental effects, and hence the need 
to reform the guarantee section of the CAP (CEC 1987).8 The EP agricultural 
committee, more radically opposed to the proposed options of environmental 
integration, criticised the Commission for considering to support “not surplus 
products but surplus, and rather poor, farmers...to do little in rather pretty country 
side” (EP 1986:64). Agriculture ministers were equally sceptical about instituting 
an EC scheme for rewarding environment-friendly farming, at least to the extent 
that this would involve a transfer of environmental management tasks to 
Commission authorities. The fact that the guarantee section remained largely 
untouched until 1992 (with the exception of some production control measures) 
and structural measures were expanded only minimally, as indicated above, is 
therefore not surprising.
The “story” behind the adoption and elaboration of the structural policy 
within the CAP aimed at environmentally sensitive areas in 1985 and 1987 is 
characteristic of the narrow path of opportunities for environmental reform within 
the CAP. Initially, the ESA scheme was proposed by the British government for 
predominantly domestic reasons. As described in more detail by Baldock and 
Lowe (1996:13-5), environmental interests placed pressure on the government to 
limit farming in sensitive areas. While a complex procedure was introduced 
whereby conservation authorities could limit farming in such areas in return for 
compensation payments, the ministry for agriculture resisted further-reaching
8 Ignoring that the majority of EC price support went to the richer, larger, modernized, Northern 
fanners (cf. CEC 1991a) who were induced by production incentives to increase their use of 
agro-chemicals and to employ the most intensive and productive farming methods, DG VI 
argued that the effect of production incentives is indirect, and hence in its aggregate 
inconclusive, as other (more marginal) farmers contribute to the protection of the environment 




























































































measures under the pretence that under EC law no national aid could be rendered 
to farmers for purposes other than farming and that therefore a change in EC 
legislation was necessary to meet the environmentalists' demands. This option 
was therefore pursued by the UK government, pushed by environmental groups 
mounting a European campaign. Despite considerable irritation among other 
member states and the Commission, the ESA scheme was integrated in 
Regulation 797/85 even though at that point only as a from now on legitimate 
option for national aid. In the amended Regulation 1760/87 the ESA payment 
scheme became eligible for EC co-financing. This brief policy history shows that 
most agricultural ministers were hesitant to internalise environmental costs or 
support environmental services domestically. They were equally resisting changes 
to the status quo of the CAP that would reduce transfer payment to the farming 
sector or implied more external control on domestic structures and practices. 
Consequently, changes in the structure of the CAP needed to be incremental and 
accompanied by generous compensation for the affected farmers. In a situation 
where resources were increasingly scarce, hence the scope for politically 
acceptable and fiscally possible compensation payments limited, emerged the 
political package of combining environmental and economic need, based on the 
new “acceptance that supporting farmers to conserve the countryside might also 
help, albeit in a modest way, to curb overproduction” (Baldock and Lowe 
1996:15).
Recurring environmental rhetoric in subsequent CAP-related Commission 
documents (CEC 1987, 1988, 1990a, 1991a) underlines the beginning of a change 
in perspective toward the environment, however. Even though the change in 
official rhetoric and the perspective of agricultural policy makers may have 
occurred only for the pragmatic reasons outlined above, in practical terms, it 
produced “the need to give some substance to the formal commitments made in 
various policy documents to integrate environmental considerations into 
agricultural policy” (Baldock and Lowe 1996:15). Similarly, agricultural policy 
makers felt increasingly constrained by the publicization of mounting evidence 
that the CAP was to a large part responsible for implementation failures of EC 
environmental legislation, such as the EC’s water legislation discussed above. For 
instance, in April 1990 the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) presented vast 
empirical evidence of environmental degradation caused by agricultural 
production and called on the Agriculture Council to “discontinue all subsidies for 
farming activities which destroy the environment” (AE, No. 5241: 25 April 
1990), to encourage environmentally friendly farming methods, to impose 
environmental controls, and to introduce the principle of environmental 
conditionality for financial outlets (discussed in Baldock 1990).9
9 The WWF analysis and demands were echoed in the European Environmental Bureau's (EEB) 




























































































By 1990, the Commission as a whole proclaimed the necessity to make 
agriculture more responsive to the needs of the environment and proposed to not 
only extend structural support for the protection of the environment but also to 
introduce certain forms of environmental conditionality and regulation (CEC 
1990a). In a political climate in which environmental issues were considered 
increasingly salient, the presence of previous legal and declaratory commitments 
to protect the countryside offered a more and more weighty resource for 
opponents of the CAP. Reacting to this pressure, even the farming sector began to 
respond favourably to the environmental agenda by generally favouring agri- 
environmental support; some representatives of the more marginal elements of 
the sector (peripheral farmers, extensive or even organic producers) even 
proposed more radical reforms of the CAP (Lenschow 1996:364-6).
Indicating that this slow change in attitudes remained far from representing 
a paradigm shift, until 1992 agro-environmental measures remained largely 
limited to structural incentives and regulatory measures proved an even bigger 
challenge in terms of surmounting the opposition from the agro-sector. The 
already mentioned Nitrate Directive stands apart in that the politicisation of the 
implementation gap in European water legislation resulted in positive action, 
although even that turned out to be limited. Aside from legal pressures and the 
costliness of remedial action, the desire to harmonize emerging member state 
policy aimed at limiting the application of agro-chemicals and livestock manure10 
as well as the realization of cross-boundary water pollution motivated EC nitrate 
legislation. Delays between the initial Commission proposal in 1988, which had 
been invited by the informal Environment Council in June of that year (Haigh 
1992:4.14-3), and the adoption of the Directive were due to member states' 
attempts to guard their national policies and some disagreement regarding the 
scope of the problem. In order to satisfy agricultural policy makers and lobbyists, 
the final EC Directive allows for compensation measures which were justified on 
the basis that the source of nitrate pollution may not be precisely traceable, 
neither geographically nor over time, but again illustrates the limits to radical 
reforms in the EC agricultural policy.
To sum up, by the early 1990s some linkage between the environment and 
agriculture was accepted by nearly all interested actors, however vast differences
10 In other words, not concerns with international competitiveness but the issue of intra-EC 
competition contributed to the adoption of the Nitrate Directive. Similarly, measures to regulate 
pesticide production and use were in part inspired by the desire to harmonise European market 
conditions (Lenschow 1996). Further, the permissible scope of national aid for structurally 
disadvantaged regions or individual farms has been an issue between EC agricultural ministers 




























































































persisted in the interpretation of the nature of this linkage and hence acceptable 
policy options. Confronted with two types of market failure — the failure to 
internalise environmental cost of production, on the one hand, and the failure to 
price environmental services rendered by the agricultural sector on the other hand 
— some consensus was emerging to deal with the latter through some form of a 
remuneration scheme. With regard to internalising environmental costs of 
agricultural production (i.e., implementing the polluter-pays-principle) the debate 
was highly polarised and remained biased toward the non-enforcement of that 
principle in regulatory action and the maintenance of public intervention that 
exacerbated rather than ameliorated the market failures. The 1992 MacSharry 
reforms were distinct from previous reform rounds in their more systematic 
attempt to deal with the government failure implied in the CAP, even though the 
need to “pay o ff’ farmers for any concessions on their part continued to shape the 
drafting of the 1992 MacSharry reforms. Significant from the perspective of this 
volume is the fact that the to this date most radical environmental and trade 
liberalizing reforms of the CAP took place in the context of the Uruguay Round. 
Before turning to this connection, let me briefly summarize the outcome of the 
MacSharry package.
The MacSharry Reforms -  An Environmental Milestone?
The MacSharry reforms that were adopted in 1992 resulted in a package that from 
an environmental point of view reduced the magnitude of the government failure 
and expanded measures to pay farmers for the provision of public services which 
would remain unremunerated under pure market conditions. The reform package 
introduced the most drastic price cuts (primarily in the cereal sector) to that date 
in exchange for direct compensation payments to those farmers who agreed to 
“set aside” 15% of their arable land. Price support for beef was equally reduced 
and farmers compensated through headage payments for up to a certain number 
of cattle per acre. In other words, the price guarantee system - coupled to 
production - continued at a lower level of support and was now supplemented by 
a new system of direct income support, offering compensation for decreasing 
prices - mostly de-coupled from production. In addition, accompanying measures 
were introduced, in part to reward farmers for providing a public service in the 
form of preserving the rural environment (i.e., to address the second market 
failure), but also to financially induce farmers to reduce the environmental costs 
they are inflicting through their production activities (i.e., to pay polluters for 





























































































an agri-environmental action programme was adopted to give recognition to the 
dual role of fanners as producers and as stewards of the countryside, and to 
encourage farming practices which are less intensive and more in tune with 
environmental constraints... which should also make a positive contribution to 
rebalancing markets (CEC 1991 b:2).
The accompanying measures amounted to more than five percent of the guarantee 
sections of the 1995 and 1996 CAP budgets, with no equivalent transfers existing 
prior to the 1992 reform. On the basis of the EU budget the precise effect of the 
cuts in the price support mechanism on the volume of financial transfers cannot 
be determined due to significant intervening factors like fluctuations in world 
agricultural prices. Considering the continuing growth of the CAP budget, 
however, it seems safe to conclude that these cuts were in large part offset by the 
- environmentally more friendly - income support payments, including the 
accompanying measures.11
The following table summarises the achievements of the MacSharry reform 
for the environment from the perspective of market and government failures, 
policy alternatives and actual choices.
11 While the offsetting process does not apply to all affected farmers equally, the initially 
intended redistributive effect in the shift in policy mechanisms was largely diverted in the 
final design of the CAP reform which theoretically permitted compensation for mandatory set 




























































































Table 7.1 Environmental Dimension of the CAP Before and After the 1992 
Reforms
Market Failures Public Policy - 1992 Reform Options 1992 Choices
Failure to Exacerbate market - status quo
internalise failure through
environmental cost protectionist system - reduce government failure
of production. coupled to production (a) mixing old system and X
output (government direct income support




- reduce market failure 




Failure to price Very limited structural - status quo
and remunerate assistance to producers
environmental in environmentally - widen structural assistance
services sensitive areas (a) EC level
(b) (sub-)national level X
- market reform X
This table reveals that the MacSharry reforms took steps to correct both market 
and government failures, without, however, eliminating either. In view of 
previous attempts to reform the CAP and the enormous obstacles encountered in 
the form of firmly institutionalised policy structures protected by powerful 
defenders of the traditional CAP, the following part inquires into under what 
conditions such “milestone” reform could be adopted.
The World Trade Context
The MacSharry reforms may not represent an optimal policy improvement for the 
environment, but they represent an agreement that lies above the lowest common 
denominator of interests voiced by agricultural ministers and their clientele at the 
beginning of the reform negotiations.12 Powerful agricultural interest groups and





























































































their “agents” in government and administration, who had successfully defended 
the CAP in its original form in the past, conceded comparatively substantial price 
cuts and a partial switch to income support. Ministers of agriculture agreed, 
despite previously voiced scepticism, to an expansion of EC administered agri- 
environmental assistance. I argue that the “environmental” reforms were 
facilitated by the political framework provided by the ongoing GATT 
negotiations at the time. In short, the 1992 CAP reforms seemed pressing for a 
variety of serious internal reasons ranging from economic inefficiencies, socio­
economic decline of rural areas, the CAP’S ever-rising burden on the EC budget, 
to its negative environmental impact. However, these internal pressures had 
existed since the 1970s. Although reform pressure was continuously mounting 
with the rise in membership, new demands to be met with European budgetary 
means (most notably the structural funds) and the EC’s legal commitment to 
integrate environmental concerns into other policy areas, reform attempts in the 
1980s had left the problematic structure of the CAP nevertheless entirely intact 
and environmental modifications were of limited impact as described above.
In the end decisive for the reform was that, by the late 1980s, agricultural 
trade had been irremovably established in the agenda of the ongoing Uruguay 
Round and the EC was put under increasing pressure to dismantle the trade­
distorting elements of the CAP.13 Before focusing on the Uruguay-environment 
link, a few words are in place about the general issue of agricultural protectionism 
in previous GATT rounds and the nature of the Agriculture Agreement adopted at 
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.
Agricultural Trade Liberalisation in GATTAVTO
The CAP support system was established on the basis of previous national 
policies, with all six members (with the possible exception of the Netherlands) 
being used to pursing agricultural policies based on market price support. It 
reflected the view that world markets were unreliable and tended to be dominated 
by the US, undermining the European goals of self-sufficiency in food stuff and 
the protection of a rural sector that was based on mostly family farms. The 
establishment of the CAP benefited from an initially tolerant reaction by the US 
due to its “generally benevolent attitude to the emerging Community on wider
13 In 1990/1 agriculture contributed only about 8.5% to the total of EC exports and accounted for 
11.5% of Community imports. However, this implied that the Community had become the 





























































































political and economic grounds” (CEC 1994a:63). Trade disputes with the US 
began in the 1960s, but the EC succeeded in resisting agricultural trade 
liberalisation measures in previous GATT rounds, claiming that “the CAP was 
still in its formative stage and could therefore not be the subject of international 
negotiations” (Buckwell 1991:235).
The CAP prompted negotiations within the GATT14 for the first time in the 
Dillon Round (1960-1), resulting in a binding of duties on oilseeds, oilseed 
products and cereal substitutes at low or even zero levels and the external tariff on 
sheepmeat at 20 per cent. These early agreements were viewed as serious 
constraints in later years when farmers continued to rely on cheap, imported 
cereal substitutes for livestock feed instead of using the more expensive, 
domestically produced surplus-cereal. From an environmental point of view, the 
reliance on imported cereal substitutes contributed to a concentration of livestock 
— and manure — production near ports. The US and the Community seriously 
clashed on agricultural matters during the Kennedy Round (1964-7) where the EC 
proposed a system of concerted market organisation and market sharing amongst 
major agricultural exporters and a common denominator for all agricultural 
support. The EC’s negotiating partners rejected the proposal on the grounds of the 
limited reduction in agricultural protection and the intervention into domestic 
agricultural policies they implied. Consequently, the negotiation results remained 
modest and posed no challenge to the CAP. The Tokyo Round (1973-9) produced 
significant results for world trade . in general but tariff reductions in the 
agricultural sector were limited to tropical products in addition to international 
agreements concerning the beef and the dairy sector.
Agricultural trade liberalisation eventually became a core element on the 
agenda of negotiators during the Uruguay Round (1986-94) with the objective “to 
improve the discipline and predictability of world agricultural trade by correcting 
and preventing restrictions and distortions, especially those linked to structural 
surpluses” (CEC 1995:14). Gradual but significant reductions in agricultural 
support and protection measures were intended in the areas of internal support 
policies, export subsidies and market access. By joining the 1986 Punta del Este 
Declaration launching the Uruguay Round and committing the negotiators to 
“increase discipline on the use of all direct and indirect subsidies and other 
measures affecting directly or indirectly agricultural trade” (Ingersent et al 
1994a:60, quoting the declaration), the EC explicitly and for the first time 
exposed the CAP'S principles and mechanisms to international negotiation.
14 This synopsis of pre-Uruguay GATT rounds is based on CEC (1995:9-11), Ingersent et al 




























































































Several observers conclude that the EC's more open negotiating stands during the 
Uruguay Round can be traced to
a conscious attempt by the Commission to impose on the domestic political 
process some constraints from outside the narrow agricultural arena, [with the 
consequence that the] agriculture ministers felt unable to oppose the general will 
to have a successful Uruguay Round, and were prepared to go along with the 
possibility of some external constraints on their action rather than risk being 
blamed for heightened trade tensions (Moyer and Josling 1990:190).15
In other words, the Uruguay negotiations placed agricultural policy makers in the 
EC in a broader political framework which challenged their insulated operations. 
By effectively linking the future of the CAP to an agreement, involving not only 
international actors but also representatives of other policy sectors, its insular 
existence responsible for its prior evolution along a narrow path (ending in a cul 
de sac) was opened and alternative policy paths emerged on the horizon.
In the final agreement,16 export subsidies are to be reduced by 21% by 
volume and 36% ad valorem and restrictions to market access (the Community's 
variable import levies and export subsidies) will be turned into fixed customs 
duties and reduced by 36% over six years (with a minimum of 15% per product). 
The variable aspect in the previous Community system is maintained, however, 
through a safeguard clause under which additional duties may be applied if the 
import volume exceeds a specific threshold level or import prices fall below a 
certain level. More significant for the environmental dimension of the deal, and 
hence the focus of this paper, domestic support for agriculture was agreed to drop 
by 20% compared with the 1986-8 reference period, with those forms of support 
that are designated to fall in the so-called “green box” (aid that has no effect on 
trade or production, such as decoupled income support or payments under 
environmental programmes) being exempted from the reduction commitments. 
Both the direct income support scheme that was devised to compensate farmers 
for cuts in price guarantees and the accompanying measures were declared to 
meet the “green box” criteria, despite some doubts regarding the true degree of 
decoupling and non-trade distortion of the compensatory measures in particular 
(more below).
With some last minute adjustments, the GATT Agreement on Agriculture 
was signed by EC members in the conviction that the post-1992 CAP was
15 See alsoBaldock and Lowe (1996:11), Ingersent et al (1994a:61), Josling (1994:514-5).
16 This summary of the agricultural provisions agreed to in the Uruguay Round's “final act” is 




























































































compatible with the agreement. Commissioner René Steichen concluded in late 
1994 that
the Community will be able to meet its new commitments under GATT without 
having to impose further constraints on farmers... [and that] with the outcome of 
the GATT negotiations, the Community has been able to attain two fundamental 
goals:
- it has contributed toward constructing an international trading regime which is 
more market-oriented, without giving up Community preference;
- it has ensured that its international commitments are compatible with the CAP 
reform, retaining sufficient flexibility to be able to manage by itself the schemes 
which are at the base of the reformed CAP, such as direct aid and rural 
development (Steichen 1994:4).
The CAP-GATTDebate and the Environment Link
The Commission summarised the basic action parameters of the Community 
during the GATT negotiations as follows:
as the foremost world agricultural trader, the Commission, by changing its rules, 
is stating its willingness to join the movement towards freer trade advocated at 
international level while preserving the basic principles and instruments of the 
CAP (CEC 1992:4).
In insisting basically on the maintenance of the status-quo of the CAP, the EC’s 
original bargaining position seemed as unmoveable as in previous years. 
However, even though only a few member states whole-heartedly favoured 
agricultural trade liberalisation (UK, the Netherlands, Denmark), most members 
including the European Commission were becoming worried about disruptions in 
international trade in general. Hence, their willingness to contemplate the 
necessary CAP reforms increased. Most notably, in Germany, with its 
considerable interest in a liberal trading regime for industrial products, 
preparedness “to reform the CAP was closely linked with the need to secure a 
successful completion of the GATT round. It seemed clear that without a 
compromise on CAP there would be no positive end of the GATT negotiations” 
(Hendriks 1994:66).
Commissioner MacSharry exploited the emergence of a more explicit 
conflict of interests between trade and agricultural policy objectives within the 
member states in his discussions with the Agriculture Council. However, he 
remained constrained by the continuing power of the agriculture representatives 
domestically and in Brussels and the fact that the kind of reforms individual 
members were willing to contemplate varied widely in scope and direction. In 




























































































arguing that the Community's hands were tied by the larger GATT context 
(Lenschow 1996:374), the possible margin of departure from the traditional 
structure of the CAP remained limited. The CAP continued to be the “classic 
story...of how, once decisions have been made and structures established, inertia 
sets in to make any reform extremely difficult” (Urwin 1991:185). Consequently, 
the reform strategy focused on cutting the directly trade-distorting features of the 
CAP within a politically acceptable margin and to compensate farmers for their 
losses through measures acceptable under GATT rules.
The distinction between trade-distorting and non-distorting measures 
corresponds to the legal and political reality of the GATT, governing only 
international trade relationships and having no authority over domestic policies 
other than those with trade distorting effects. Long-time CAP analyst Harvey 
stresses that
the achievable objective of multilateral negotiations is, therefore, to minimise 
trade distortions, not necessarily to eliminate protection or domestic income 
support...It is now recognised that domestic support of agriculture must be 
allowed to continue within this constraint, given national desire so to do (Harvey 
1994:237).
Already the 1987 EC position paper had referred to the possibility of 
compensating producers for reduced price support with decoupled payments, that 
is, “direct methods of supporting farmers' incomes which are not linked to 
output” (Ingersent et al 1994a:61-2). On this principle there existed no 
disagreement with the main GATT negotiating partners. The US, in its revised 
position paper on agriculture of 15 October 1990, elaborated on the distinction 
between more or less trade distorting domestic support measures. It proposed that 
most trade-distorting domestic support measures, such as market price supports, 
deficiency payments and production-linked input subsidies, be cut substantially, 
while non-trade distorting agricultural programmes, such as environmental 
protection, resource retirement and diversion, income safety net programs and 
bona fide food aid, be exempt from any reduction commitment (Ingersent et al 
1994a: 69).
The challenge to distinguish clearly trade distorting domestic support 
measures from others was therefore not one of principle but one of operational 
detail. Multilateral trade negotiators needed to identify criteria for distinguishing 
between agricultural protection and trade distortion. In the absence of such - 
mutually agreeable - criteria, the GATT negotiations showed that the presence of 
primarily domestic social and environmental objectives of a policy helped 




























































































Least controversial in this respect were the accompanying environmental 
measures adopted under the MacSharry reform because they represent payments 
for the provision of a public good with indeed minimal effects on agricultural 
trade. Free trade purists may argue that some environmental programmes support 
the production of marketable goods that otherwise would not have been 
produced, hence distort trade, but the public good character of the measures is 
likely to outweigh the distorting effects.
It is less clear whether the new direct income support payments 
(compensating for price support cuts) introduced in the MacSharry reform ought 
to qualify as non- or minimally trade-distorting measures, and hence GATT 
exemption, that is, “green box” treatment. First, EC compensation payments have 
actually been made conditional upon continued sowing on the farmers’ permitted 
crop area (historic area minus set-aside). Therefore, the payments are not fully 
decoupled from production, even though they do limit compensation to historic 
levels of production. Secondly, similar to the distorting effect described above, 
“to the extent that [compensation payments] enable resources to remain in 
agriculture rather than be encouraged to leave, as they would be under genuine 
and uncompensated free trade...the agricultural sector will be larger than without 
the compensation payments and hence remain distorted compared with free trade” 
(Harvey 1994:246-7). Mandatory set-aside imposed by the MacSharry reforms on 
compensation recipients would not be necessary under a fully decoupled regime. 
They were in fact “included in the CAP reform programme in large part because 
the price level was not reduced far enough” (Josling 1994:518).
The fact that both the EC-reform compensation schemes as well as US 
direct income payments were accorded “green box” status represents a political 
compromise that contributed to the rescuing of the Uruguay Round. In pursuing 
this compromise, EC negotiators believed that “the environmental aspect of the 
reform will facilitate its acceptance outside the EC” (UK Minister of Agriculture 
Gummer, quoted in AE, No. 5670: 30 April 1992). Taking advantage of the 
emerging environmental agenda in international trading fora, Agriculture 
Ministers were confident that the new compensatory aids would not be subject to 
any disciplines arising from a GATT settlement. And indeed, the GATT 
‘Agreement on Agriculture’ adopted the argumentation of the EC in “its 
commitment to the liberalisation of trade through reducing domestic support for 
agricultural production, particularly of production-linked agricultural subsidies” 
and the creation of exemption “boxes” for measures “that have, at most, a 
minimal impact on trade,” and a potentially positive one on output reduction and 




























































































Sceptics may argue that the lack of clearly defined criteria qualifying 
domestic support measures for GATT exemption will turn the “green box" into “a 
repository of all policies that countries wish to shelter from international attack” 
(Josling 1994:520). Equally, the reform’s surplus-reducing and environmental 
“selling points” such as the mandatory set-aside are not only second-best from a 
surplus point of view but also ambiguous with respect to their environmental 
benefits because the scheme opens the possibility of “slippage” in that farmers 
may set-aside their least productive area and shift agro-inputs to the land 
promising higher yields. But nevertheless, the reformed CAP can be characterised 
as “qualitatively better than before” from a liberal trading and an environmental 
perspective (Josling 1994: 519).
It appears that the exogenous pressure of the GATT negotiations 
accelerated the previously gradual reframing of the CAP from an “industrial” to a 
“rural development” policy (with its social and environmental components) for 
which the agenda was set by the Commission in the mid-1980s. While 
considerable misgivings continue to exist within the European farming 
population (represented in Brussels by COPA) with respect to the shift to direct 
income aid, even farming associations began to accept the role of the farmer in 
the protection of the rural environment and criticised the accompanying measures 
solely for their limited nature that failed to adequately reward the sector for its 
provision of public goods. COPA has equally refined its position with respect to 
multilateral trade agreements, switching from a merely defensive position to 
calling on the GATT/WTO to recognise more fully the social and environmental 
dimension of agriculture. Only recently COPA argued that “[i]n world trade with 
agricultural products, it is important to define competition conditions in order to 
avoid destabilising environmentally friendly production systems, and to facilitate 
sustainable development in all regions throughout the world” (COPA/COGECA 
1995a:3). The following concluding part will point to potential problems implied 
in this seemingly increasingly cosy relationship between agricultural interests, 
environmentalists and free traders.
Discussion and Scenarios
The discussion so far has demonstrated that the agri-environmental agenda served 
as a bridge between defenders of the CAP and proponents of trade liberalisation. 
Both camps were able to reach face-saving agreements, in part due to the casting 
of continuing extensive payments to the farming sector as direct or indirect 
contributions to environmental protection. In this final part, I will argue that the 




























































































environmental and trade liberalisation objectives.17 Already mentioned in the 
previous section were doubts with respect to the non-trade distorting 
characteristics of the environmental and income compensation measures 
introduced in the MacSharry reforms. Secondly, as already hinted in table 1, trade 
liberalisation is not sufficient to deal with the negative environmental 
externalities of agricultural production. Thirdly, the adoption of environmental 
rhetoric by the farming sector has great potential to be abused in future attempts 
to block rather than extend trade liberalisation, as is already becoming evident in 
EC relations with its neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC).
Economic and Environmental Insufficiencies o f the CAP-GATT Deal
While the 1992 CAP reform has been presented as a dramatic departure from past 
practice, doubts persist whether it will actually result in the anticipated economic, 
fiscal, social and environmental effects. Pressure on the EC budget certainly has 
not dropped, causing concern with respect to the anticipated enlargement toward 
CEEC and the possible need for further reforms. Most critical observers of the 
CAP18 foresee the necessity of a(nother) radical CAP reform to accommodate the 
CEEC. In contrast, most national delegations of the Agriculture Council advocate 
continuity of the CAP and place the responsibility of adjustment on the 
prospective new members, arguing for a long transition period. Similarly, the 
Commission is not contemplating radical changes.19 Past experience suggests that 
for the CEEC expansion to trigger deeper cuts in the trade-distorting and costly 
price support mechanism, additional exogenous pressures need to be exerted. But, 
already limiting the space for external attack, Commissioner Fischler recently 
called upon
the US government to understand that the European Agreements cannot be dealt
with in GATTAVTO as a simple case of free trade area, as some US authorities
17 The domestic socio-economic implications of the CAP reforms are not the focus of this 
discussion, though certainly crucial for future policy planning.
18 These include the Swedish and possibly the British governments among the member state 
delegations.
19 Commissioner Fischler recently presented the Commission’s position in favour of pursuing 
future CAP reform on the basis of the MacSharry package, focusing on its operational 
simplification, the application of the subsidiarity principle, and the definition of a clearer 
distinction between market policy and income support. In that context, income support shall be 
more closely tied to social and environmental objectives. (AE, No. 6615: 29 November 1995 




























































































seem to believe, for these agreements are simply a stage towards an enlarged EU 
and a wide area of stability in Europe (AE, No. 6674: 24 February 1996:11).
In other words, current rhetoric suggests little inclination among CAP policy 
makers to go further along the path of trade liberalisation.20
Turning to the environmental improvements accomplished with the 
MacSharry reforms, scepticism prevails as well. While Agriculture 
Commissioners Steichen and Fischler reported a notable drop in the use of 
chemical fertilisers and pesticides as a result of the partial decoupling of 
assistance from production (Steichen 1994:3, Fischler quoted in AE No. 6658, 2. 
February 1996:8), an expert report commissioned by the Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs concludes that
[t]he current CAP market reforms are unlikely to change dramatically the level of 
externalities, both positive and negative, produced by EC agriculture, although 
there should be a better balance towards more extensive crop and livestock 
production (CEC 1994a:29).
These contrasting views can be traced to the analysts' different focus on market 
and government failures. The price cut and “decoupling” policy may indeed work 
towards reducing the government failure which exacerbates the failure of the 
market to integrate environmental cost, but it fails to tackle the existing market 
failures, for instance through additional regulatory measures or economic 
instruments (such as input taxes).21
Liberalisation of agricultural policies would involve a change in incentive 
structures that...is likely to reduce both the damage inflicted on the global 
environment and the chemical residues in the food produced in the world’s 
farmers. Both the environment and welfare could be enhanced even further if the 
removal of distortions to the relative price of food products were to be 
accompanied by the introduction of optimal environmental policy instruments 
and/or the removal of distortions to farm input prices (Anderson 1993:167).
20 To the extend that the Commission succeeds in clarifying the distinction of market and 
income support and the environmental dimension in these categories of support, it might 
diminish its chances for “window dressing” in future trade negotiations, however.
21 Regulatory measures in particular suffer from the problem of identifying the polluter in 
agricultural production. Water pollution, the main problem arising in from European agriculture, 
occurs with considerable time lag from the actual application of polluting substances and the 
precise tracing of the source is quite impossible. A comprehensive policy to deal with water 




























































































However, the effective reduction of the environmental non-market, government 
failures of the CAP itself is in doubt due to the indirect mechanism linking 
changes of market support to environmental results combined with the absence of 
monitoring and control provisions or a form of environmental conditionality. This 
oversight is due to the policy’s attempt to achieve various goals (surplus 
reduction and environmental protection) with one instrument (price cuts). Many 
policy analysts argue that domestic agricultural and trade targets in agriculture 
should be matched with domestic agricultural and trade instruments, and 
environmental targets with environmental instruments (Baldock et al 1992, Floyd 
1995, Runge 1994). Their advice overlooks however, that “policy analysis is one 
thing; politics another” and especially in agricultural matters (Grant 1995:17).
The absence of monitoring and control elements or environmental 
conditionality equally undermines the effectiveness of direct environmental 
projects. In addition, they suffer from the vague and nearly all encompassing legal 
parameters allowing projects of quite dubious environmental merits to be funded, 
as well as their limited funding. Council Regulation (EEC) 2087/92 calls upon 
member states to develop and financially support (sub-)national agro- 
environmental programmes, but the national responses vary dramatically.22 
Environmental organisations have pointed out a lack of integration of the 
accompanying measures with other CAP and structural policies (Birdlife 1994). 
For instance, farmers may be discouraged from long-term environmental set aside 
as long as they are also mandated to set aside land in order to qualify for 
compensation payments; payments for environmental projects may not suffice as 
an incentive to forego continuing market support.
Despite much environmental rhetoric, even agriculture ministers were 
aware of the limited environmental benefits to be expected from the reform. UK 
Agriculture Minister Gummer announced that the fuller integration of 
environmental protection in the CAP constituted one of his priorities during the 
British presidency in the second half of 1992 (AE, No. 5772, 15 July 1992) and 
he invited the Commission to put forward proposals to this effect (AE, No. 5826, 
1 October 1992). Nothing much has happened since then as the subsidiarity and 
deregulation debates have blocked an expansion or redirection of EC activities 
without yet leading to effective measures on the national level (CEC 1996a).
22 90 percent of all Austrian farms and 50 percent of all German farms participate in the scheme, 
whereas (for different reasons) less than 10 percent of Belgian, Danish, Italian or Dutch farms do 





























































































Given the constraints to continuing radical changes of the CAP and 
environmental policy integration, the question arises whether the - at least partial 
- re-nationalisation of agricultural policy may offer a solution to the 
environmental problématique. Such a move would correspond to the EC’s 
increasing attempt to implement the subsidiarity principle and avoid over­
regulation from the European level. Indeed, the at least partial devolution of 
environmental and general income assistance programs to the national level may 
be a sensible way of dealing with highly divergent regional climatic and 
geological conditions as well as socio-economic and political preferences 
(Ockenden and Franklin 1995). Wilkinson stresses that Council Regulation No. 
2078/92 has increased the scope for member states to support the income of their 
farmers and views this as a path to pursue in the future ( Wilkinson 1994: 26-29).
There may be limits, however, to a re-nationalisation strategy - politically 
and with respect to its environmental benefits. Given the experience that (partial) 
“re-nationalising” has been and continues to be a taboo in European agricultural 
circles,23 the introduction of this concept with respect to the implementation of 
the guarantee and guidance sections of the CAP borders on revolutionary. 
Commissioner Fischler's recent remarks on the subject have triggered a defensive 
reaction in the Council with respect to the “common” guarantees of the CAP. For 
instance, agricultural ministers warned that the prospect of eastern enlargement 
must not “serve as a pretext for dismantling or renationalising the CAP” (AE, No. 
6617: 1. December 1995). Partial re-nationalisation of the guidance section, on 
the other hand, may be politically possible, considering the member states’ past 
reluctance to allow EC structural intervention and the relative costliness of EC 
management of mostly sub-national programmes (Whitby 1996). However, 
existing options for national agri-environmental measures suggest a danger of 
imposing too few environmental safeguards.24
In the absence of EC controls and, even limited, co-ordination, re­
nationalisation may also re-introduce EC-internal trade distortions, allowing a 
situation where the richer countries will support their farmers for simply 
maintaining their presumably environment friendly production methods while 
poorer countries may not be able to afford similar assistance to their rural sector. 
From an international trade perspective, re-nationalisation does not alter the EC’s
23 In reality, the “common market” character of the CAP has begun to disappear since the 
introduction of the Monetary Compensation Amounts in the early 1970s.
24 Ockenden and Franklin quote claims that Germany has used the discretion provided within 




























































































obligations. In other words, income support measures do not escape GATT 
scrutiny by being devolved from the European to the national or sub-national 
level. Such measures may make EC-internal co-ordination during the next WTO 
round more cumbersome, however. In sum, while the re-nationalisation of agri- 
environmental measures may contribute to relieving the EC budget and even the 
protection of the environment, adequate framework conditions will need to be 
established on the EC level to ensure positive environmental effects, prevent 
trade distortion within the Community, and allow for effective EC representation 
during future trade negotiations.
A Green Protectionist Scenario?
The EC has been at the forefront of actors arguing the compatibility of 
environmental protection, economic development and competitiveness in a free 
trade regime (CEC 1993, 1994b, 1996c, Advisory Group on Competitiveness 
1995). With respect to agriculture it is stating its “keen interest in ensuring that 
WTO members respect their commitments...and in particular those regarding the 
reduction of subsidised exports and market access” (CEC 1996d:8). 
Nevertheless, there are indications that a proper balance between maintaining a 
favourable framework for environmental protection and agricultural trade 
liberalisation may not be easy to find.
“Green protectionism” may indeed become a consequence of the new 
image adopted by the agricultural sector. The prospect of bilateral trading 
agreements with agricultural competitors (e.g., South Africa) has already caused 
opponents to these agreements within the EC to point to the higher environmental 
costs bom by European farmers and hence the competitive disadvantage suffered. 
Agriculture Ministers have expressed
alarm to see the Union taking giant steps on the attractive but overly risky path of 
free trade at regional level... [Admitting that] liberalising of trade, which will 
doubtless continue, can offer benefits for the agricultural community], they 
emphasised that...] given the social, environmental and animal protection 
constraints which are stricter in the Union than in a good many third countries, 
free trade can offer an unfair advantage to its partners (AE, No. 6727: 13/4 May 
1996: 11).
Also the prospective enlargement of the Community towards CEEC has caused 
alarm in the agricultural community. As integration of CEEC is likely to 
introduce new pressures for reform on the CAP, COPA is preparing its “defence” 
by pointing to the enormous “divergence between the economic, social and 
environmental conditions in the EU and the candidate countries,” arguing that the 




























































































rushed” (COPA/COGECA 1995b). The prospect of “green protectionism” should 
not be overstated, however, as presently the transformation in the transfer 
mechanisms to the farming sector from price guarantees to “green” income 
support is still limited.
To conclude, as the status quo and these slowly crystallising future scenarios 
indicate, the political debate and reality concerning the compatibility of 
environmental objectives and trade liberalisation, the possibility of green 
protectionism, as well as the future for environmental policy integration into 
European agricultural policy has not yet been decided. The current IGC may 
become a milestone in that evolution, for instance, if it results in a rewording of 
Article 39 of the Treaty and introduces the protection of the environment as one 
of the CAP's policy objectives.25 Given the remarkable stability of the CAP in the 
past, the next turning point may have to wait until the next WTO multilateral 
trade negotiations, which may then take place in the framework of new WTO- 
environmental parameters. Certainly in the past two decades, the context of 
external pressure has stimulated CAP reform more effectively than even extreme 
internal crises, ranging from enlargement to a budgetary crunch.
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